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Can presidential tweets influence the stock market? The paper answers this question by 
analyzing Brexit-related tweets posted by Boris Johnson during his premiership. The 
uninformative nature of Johnson’s digital statements suggests that our hypothesis, if confirmed, 
would contradict the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). Through an event study, we found a 
positive and statistically significant effect of tweets on the FTSE100’s returns. Findings were 
additionally corroborated by a regression analysis and a robustness check. The positive effect 
can be attributed to the investors valuing positively the reduced uncertainty on Brexit, but the 
overreaction to uninformative information remains incompatible with the EMH. 
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If there is something more volatile and uncertain than stock markets, that is (probably) the 
behavior of a politician. Making the (“strong”) assumption that politicians are coherent with 
what they say, it is possible to grasp useful insights from their public declarations and form 
expectations about the future actions of a government. Joking aside, there is an important truth: 
the words pronounced by political leaders have a high specific weight. 
Concretely, they can have a dramatic impact on the economic system (consumers’ confidence, 
investments, job market) and the financial system (stock and bond markets, banking system) 
within and outside the national boundaries. 
Nowadays, social media platforms have created a new, fast and effective written way to 
communicate. Shrewd politicians have embraced these new media, using direct, more frequent 
and, sometimes, colloquial contact with people. Moreover, this type of communication has 
been legitimized. That is, it is used for official and institutional communications. 
In the context of the efficient market hypothesis, it is interesting to investigate whether 
presidential remarks on social media represent an additional (and robust) source of information 
for investors. According to the efficient market hypothesis (hereinafter EMH), stock prices 
fully reflect all the information available to investors (Fama, 1969). Depending on what we 
mean by “available information”, we can distinguish among three forms of the EMH: weak, 
semi-strong and strong. 
The purpose of my research is to challenge the semi-strong market hypothesis, which posits 
that prices reflect all publicly available information. Whenever new public information is 
released, rational arbitrageurs (expert traders) compete in order to exploit a temporary market 
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inefficiency and make a profit. Competition is pivotal in order to maintain an equilibrium 
status. However, there exist some uninformed investors (noise traders) who believe to make a 
profit even if the information has already been released, either completely or partially. 
The statistical significance of (uninformative) social media declarations in determining the 
market fluctuations, if confirmed, might demonstrate a market inefficiency. Indeed, efficient 
markets should not be influenced by those types of information. 
In order to test the EMH, it was studied the effects of Brexit-related tweets of Boris Johnson, 
the UK Prime Minister, on the FTSE100 index. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the most relevant 
finance literature related to the topics under discussion. In section 3 are presented the data and 
the methodology applied to address our research question. Section 4 is the core part of the 
paper: here are disclosed and discussed the results of the analysis. Section 5 summarises the 
major findings, their implications and offers insights for future research. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The revolutionary consequence of the EMH is that stock prices move according to a random 
walk. A random walk is defined as “a simple model where the current value of a series is simply 
the previous value perturbed by a white noise (error) term” (Brooks, 2014). 
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Randomness, thus unpredictability, is not inconsistent with efficient prices (i.e. prices fully 
reflecting available information) as initially hypothesized by scholars (Kendall, 1953). The 
concept of random movement is strictly associated with new information release, which are 
indeed unforeseeable, and not to irrational forces driving the markets. In semi-strong efficient 
markets, it follows that technical analysis, fundamental analysis and active investment 
strategies are unreliable. However, academia found out a list of market anomalies which 
challenge the semi-strong hypothesis. Examples of market anomalies include small-firm effect, 
January effect, neglected stocks, book-to-market ratios. In all these instances, the returns seem 
to be inconsistent (and higher) with respect to the risk-adjusted returns predicted by a model 
(CAPM). 
 
2.2 Social Media and Asset Pricing 
The proposed paper belongs also to the literature dedicated to the role of information transition 
in financial markets. As aforementioned, information has a determining role for demand-supply 
dynamics in stock markets. Accordingly, numerous researches emphasize the media’s effects 
on stocks by differentiating information on the type (numeric or nonnumeric) and the channel 
of casting (television, newspapers, internet) (Tetlock, 2014). Recently, a niche branch of 
research devoted to the relationship between social media’s information and asset pricing. 
Contrarily to traditional media, social media lets its users participate both passively and 
actively in the information transition and allows interactions among users. 
A benchmark paper from Chen et. al (2014) demonstrated the existence of a “wisdom of 
crowds” by conducting a textual analysis on user-articles published on SeekingAlpha.com, a 
leading US social networking site for investors. In practice, the peer opinions shared on the 
social media significantly foretold future stock returns and earnings surprises.  
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In general, previous literature focuses chiefly on the effects of tweets (Twitter’s posts) on US 
financial markets. Whether there are obvious reasons behind the rationale of analysing the US 
financial markets (high liquidity, efficiency, volumes traded), this might not be as clear 
regarding the choice of Twitter.  
There are two main reasons which explain the use of Twitter as the main source of data. First, 
Twitter allows users to easily get access to voluntarily public shared information through its 
APIs (application programming interfaces). Whilst there are some constraints on the amount 
of downloadable data, they are less than the ones imposed by other platforms (for instance 
Facebook). Second, there exist several software libraries which can access the Twitter API and 
can be used for data mining. 
H. K. Sul et. al (2016) showed how a sentiment analysis on tweets citing a specific stock is 
linked to the stock returns in the following days. Moreover, the study divided the tweets 
according to the number of followers of the typing users. Tweets from less followed users and 
with no retweets, hence not widespread, revealed a more powerful impact on future returns 
than more followed tweets. Bartov et. al (2018) conducted a similar study, but instead of 
focusing on stock returns, they tried to test the predictive power of tweets’ sentiment analysis 
on a company’s future earnings. Also, in this case, there is a stronger significance for firms in 
weaker information environments (small size, low analysts’ attention, low institutional 
ownership).  
Despite public opinion accent political tweets and common sense would suggest that stock 
markets might react to those news, there are no renown empirical researches clarifying this 
issue. This paper attempts to fill this gap and deepen the previous literature by adding two 
fundamental elements. First, it investigates a new market (FTSE100) based on specific tweets 
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by the UK Prime Minister. Second, in lieu of modelling the research after a tweets’ sentiment 
analysis, the study classifies the announcements according their content (i.e. keywords).  
 
3. Data and methods 
3.1 Data 
The entire study is built around the Twitter’s activity of Boris Johnson. Amidst the thousands 
of posts from the UK Prime Minister, it was selected a smaller sample of Brexit’s tweets written 
from the beginning of his premiership (24/07/2019) until the most recent Brexit-related tweet 
(03/02/2020)1. With “Brexit’s tweets” we mean statements explicitly referring to Brexit. In 
order to be categorized as such, they needed to contain specific words which are connected to 
the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. The list of words was created ad hoc for the purpose of 
the paper and is showcased in Table 1. Observations, that is tweets and FTSE100 prices, are 
on a daily basis. 
The constraints applied enable to isolate the announcements made by Boris Johnson, one of the 
Brexit’s strongest supporters, whose government’s main purpose was to guide the country to 
“get Brexit done”. Theoretically, rational investors should have been highly confident that 
Britain would leave the EU under the Johnson’s presidency. In an EMH setting, due to the 
climate of reduced uncertainty and the uninformative content2 of the public tweets, we would 
expect the market (FTSE100) to not react to these digital bulletins.  
 
1 Last update on 26/03/2020. 
2 See Table 1 in “Annex: Brexit-related tweets”.  
From a qualitative analysis, it emerges that Johnson does not use his Twitter accounts for official declarations on Brexit. His 
tweets contain principally political slogans (repeated several times) which do not provide useful insights to investors.  
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3.2 Event Study 
By definition, an event study quantifies the impact of a certain event on a security’s value. This 
procedure has been extensively applied to study the effect on stock prices of events like stock 
splits, dividend payments, earning announcements, M&A transactions, changes in capital 
structure. It therefore seems the most appropriate tool to test whether the UK stock market 
behaved differently after presidential tweets on Brexit.  
A schematic approach to event study was presented by MacKinley (1997) and can be 
summarized through the following 3-stage procedure: 
1. Specify the event of interest and the event timeline. 
2. Determine a model for the normal stock return and calculate abnormal returns. 
3. Build a hypothesis testing on the aggregated abnormal returns. 
In the matter in question, the events analyzed are Brexit-related tweets. Figure 1 shows the 
timeline of our event study.  
 
Figure 1 
The date in which a tweet is published is identified as the “event date” (t1). Each event date is 
associated with a trading date or an adjusted (trading) date if the tweet is posted on either a 
non-trading day or at market closed3. The adjusted date is simply the next closest trading day.  
 
3 After 4:30 pm on a trading day. 
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The event window, namely the period in which the event is studied, goes from the event date 
(t1=0) until the subsequent 10 days (t2=10). To investigate short-run effects, it is common to 
analyze the event date and the 10 days before and after it, in order to have a more 
comprehensive and accurate view of the phenomenon under consideration (Brooks, 2014). 
However, in this study, it does not make sense to include days prior to the event date, given 
that the market cannot acquire in advance the information contained in the tweet.  
The estimation window is a period prior to the event date that is used for the computation of 
the normal returns (i.e. expected returns of the security if the event did not occur). Robustness 
of results was enhanced by considering three different estimation windows: 1 month (20 days), 
3 months (60 days) and 6 months (120 days). It is remarkable to outline that event dates are 
excluded from the estimation windows to assure the accuracy of normal returns. 
The most relevant output in the second step is the calculation of the abnormal returns (ARs). 
The abnormal return of security i at time t is: 
                                                                𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑁𝑅𝑖,𝑡                                                   (1) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the ex post (actual) returns of the security and 𝑁𝑅𝑖,𝑡is the normal returns of the 
security over the estimation window.  
Previous literature describes two different approaches for calculating the normal returns: the 
constant mean return model and the market model. The former employs the return of a market 
index in order to capture marketwide price movements, while the latter models a statistical 
linear relation between the return of the security and the market portfolio (deJong, 2010).  
Since the research does not examine a single security or a portfolio of securities, but rather the 
overall market returns, it makes sense to use the constant mean return model. Indeed, the market 
model would imply regressing the FTSE100 returns on themselves. 
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According the constant mean return model, the normal returns are defined as: 





𝑠=𝑇1                                                      (2) 
where T=T2-T1+1 is the length of the estimation period and 𝑅𝑖,𝑠is the logarithmic return of the 
FTSE100 at s.  
With day level observations4, we derived a sample of N=149 events. The abnormal returns on 
N events over the event window can be presented in a matrix notation as follows: 
 
Inferences can be drawn by aggregating the ARs in 2 modes: through time for the same event, 
through time and across events.  
The time aggregation is done through the average of abnormal returns (AAR) at time t (𝑡1 ≤
𝑡 ≤ 𝑡2): 





𝑖=1                                                              (3) 
The AAR isolates the effects related to the event because the average value neutralizes all 
possible noisy information (unrelated to the event). 
The second type of aggregation is accomplished by averaging the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs). CARs assort abnormal returns by event and can help to examine the returns over the 
entire event window:  
 
4 A single abnormal return is calculated for each event date, no matter how many tweets were made in the same day. 
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                                                           𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1                                                            (4) 
As before, inferences are computed on an average value, namely the cumulative average 
abnormal return (CAAR): 





𝑖=1                                                     (5) 
Alternatively, the CAAR can be calculated as: 
                                                           𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1                                                         (6) 
At this point, it is possible to perform a hypothesis testing on the aggregated abnormal returns 
in order to verify whether they were statistically different from zero. Tests were executed on 
both AARs and the CAAR. Hereunder are exhibited the null (𝐻0) and alternative hypotheses 
(𝐻1) of the different tests. 
Given an estimation period (T), it was tested the AARs for each t in the event window: 
𝐻0: 𝐸(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) = 0 
𝐻1: 𝐸(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) ≠ 0 
Moreover, for each T, we tested: 
𝐻0: 𝐸(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅) = 0   
𝐻1: 𝐸(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅) ≠ 0 
A simple t-test was used in order to reject or not 𝐻0. The final decision was set on test statistics 
(TS) which can be assumed to be normally distributed. The Central Limit Theorem states that 










≈ 𝑁(0, 1) 
where N is the sample size, 𝐸(𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡) is the sample mean of the AR at time t, 𝑠𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡is the standard 
error of 𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡, 𝐸(𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅) is the estimated CAAR and 𝑠𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑡is its standard error. This condition 
enables us to use the critical values of the cumulative standard normal distribution as a 
benchmark when testing hypotheses.  
 
3.3 Regression Analysis 
A regression analysis was designed to corroborate the results of the event study and to establish 
a linear relation among the variables of interest. The econometric model adopted is an OLS 
regression model which comprises daily observations j from 24/07/2019 to 03/02/2020.   
Models were developed after controlling for issues (non-stationarity, heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation) which could have biased the inferences. The outputs of the econometric tests 
(ADF, White and Breusch-Godfrey) are disclosed in Table 2. It can be noticed that there were 
no problems of non-stationarity. On the other hand, when necessary, autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity were corrected by using HAC standard errors.  
 
The estimated model has the form: 
                   𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑜𝑔(1+ 𝐵𝐽𝑗) + 𝛽2𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗−10 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡                        (7) 
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The independent variable, 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗, is the cumulative abnormal return of the FTSE100 at time j. 
The chosen regressors are: 𝐵𝐽𝑗 (a count variable which reflects the number of tweets posted on  
j)5 , 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗−10 (the CAR of the FTSE100 at time j-10) and 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑗 (a dummy variable 
which takes value 1 if there is an interest rates announcement by the BoE on j and 0 otherwise).  
The presence of CAR as dependent variable and its 10 days lag as independent variable is taken 
from Chen et al. (2014). Note that 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗−10 is included in order to control eventual effects 
unleashed by past information (other than tweets), while 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑗 ensures that the effects 
of a critical macroeconomic news is caught. The statistical significance of 𝛽
1
would affirm the 
role of tweets in determining the cumulative market movements over the estimation window. 
 
3.4 Robustness check 
The integrity of previous findings was additionally challenged by excluding from our event 
study days in conjunction with the major events on the Brexit timeline6 (elections, public 
statements by influential politicians, relevant parliament sessions at national and European 
level) and announcements on the base rate by the Bank of England (BoE).  
By doing so, we obtained a subsample potentially less biased by alternative sources of 
information other than Twitter. Table 3 shows further details on the dates.  
The final subsample for the event study has 79 observations, 70 less than the original sample, 
but still a size large enough to assume a normal distribution of returns. The statistical 
significance of abnormal returns under the new conditions, if confirmed, would prove the 
 
5 The logarithmic transformation was applied in order to correct the skewness. 
6 These events are disclosed in “Brexit timeline: events leading to the UK’s exit from the European Union”, a periodic 
publication available on the House of Commons website. 
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4.1 Event Study, regression analysis and robustness check 
The outcomes of the event study are at odds with the semi-strong market hypothesis. In essence, 
the hypotheses testing substantiate that the CAARs are statistically different from 0. As 
exemplified in Table 4a, there is statistical evidence of the FTSE100 reacting positively to the 
Brexit-related tweets of Boris Johnson in the period comprising the event date and the 
subsequent 10 days. The magnitude of the CAARs and the statistical significance of the test is 
inversely linked to the estimation window’s length. Assuming that the market would have 
behaved as last month, namely considering a 20 days estimation window for normal returns, 
the estimated cumulative abnormal returns after a Brexit-tweet is 2.64% and it is statistically 
significant at 1% (𝑇𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅20 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 = 9.78). With a 3 months estimation window (60 days), the 
CAAR is 0.69% and is statistically significant at 1%. Finally, results are also confirmed with a 
120 days estimation window: CAAR is 0.50% and has a t-stat of 2.12 (significant at 5%). 
Hypothesis tests on ARs did not prove to be as powerful as the one with CAARs. From Table 
4b, it is evident that ARs have a positive sign, but their statistical significance is confirmed only 
with the shortest estimation window. 
As displayed in Table 5, the regression models bear coherent results. Overall, the three models 
show a conspicuous goodness of fit (𝑟2) which improves as T decreases.  
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The independent variable which takes into account the tweets, 𝐵𝐽𝑗, is statistically significant at 
1% in all the three models. The coefficient estimates for 𝑙𝑜𝑔(1+ 𝐵𝐽𝑗) increase as the 
estimation window shrinks: it varies from 0.0301 (T=120) to 0.0462 (T=20). While the precise 
coefficient interpretation is not straightforward7, it is interesting to observe that a higher 
number of Brexit-related tweets produces a positive effect on the CARs. 
In accordance with macroeconomic theory (Blanchard, 2017), the outputs disclose the 
statistical significance of 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑗 at 5%: the interest rate announcements by the BoE do 
influence the market movements. However, the negative sign of the regression coefficient is 
misleading given that the BoE did not change its base rate in the short period analyzed. 
Practically, as T=20, the regression coefficient 𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑗 is -0.0279: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗 decreases of  
0.0279 each time the BoE made its base rate announcements. 
The regression coefficients of 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗−10, which control for past market trends, are not 
statistically significant at 5%: we can claim that they have no impact on 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗. 
 
Lastly, the robustness check corroborates the previous findings. The more stringent conditions 
applied to the subsample, aimed at cancelling impacts of (noisy) information other than tweets, 
validate the positive and statistically significant CAARs found in the event study (Table 6a). 
Moreover, the CAARs appear remarkably higher and more significant for estimation windows 
of 60 and 120 days.  
As regards the regression analysis, the constraints applied to the subsample did not alter the 
validity of previous results: figures confirm the statistical significance of 𝐵𝐽𝑗 (Table 6b). 
 




4.2 Discussion of results 
At a glance, the FTSE100’s euphoria after these announcements might seem counterintuitive. 
Here two questions arise: why should the market react to these uninformative statements and 
why the reaction is positive?   
In our context, it could have happened that uninformed investors either traded impulsively or 
priced the higher likelihood of Brexit to happen under the Johnson’s premiership or simply 
tried to speculate. Although it is not possible to delineate the exact circumstances that sparked 
the abnormal returns, it is important to stress the common denominator of the proposed 
conjectures: the market’s reaction to uninformative statements. The latter alone is sufficient to 
claim that the market failed to comply with the EMH on this occasion. 
Literature on information transmission embodies accredited papers which highlighted market 
overreaction to uninformative media contents and how this phenomenon can help to explain 
market anomalies (Tetlock, 2014). This does not entail that informative news are irrelevant in 
asset pricing, but rather that investors do not always react immediately and rationally to 
information release as the EMH postulates. As suggested by Peng and Xiong (2006), investors 
tend to emphasize widely applicable and general (market, industry-level) news, which are 
cheaper to process than detailed, firm-specific information (cash-flows, accruals etc.). It 
follows that prices overreact to general information and underreact to specific information. 
Tetlock (2011) discovered that investors might not discern new from stale information and 
whether other investors have already incorporated it into the asset price. This causes the market 
to respond excessively to old information too. Both the papers proved how investors’ 
irrationality and low attention can bring to implications contradictory to the EMH, i.e. trading 




The positive effect on the aggregated cumulative returns can be explained by the fact that 
Johnson’s commitment to Brexit is reinforced in each of his clear-cut statements. In our case, 
the reduced uncertainty on Brexit is positively valued by the investors. This supposition is 




Investors facing Brexit, an epochal and never seen before event, may lack an adequate set of 
information which allows to form rationally a single probability distribution of returns. In such 
a situation of ambiguity investors might consider and price different scenarios, each with its 
own distribution of returns. In principle, this is not against the semi-strong EMH, as long as 
the expectations, and in turn securities’ fluctuations, are based on public available, new and 
informative disclosures. However, our study demonstrates that the market overreacted to the 
unenlightening content posted by the UK Prime Minister on Twitter, an outcome not expected 
in an EMH world.  
Evidence suggests that the statements of the Downing Street’s premier trigger positive 
cumulative abnormal returns. The positive effect on the cumulative abnormal returns can be 
attributed to investors assigning a positive value to the lower uncertainty on the Brexit process 
(caused by Johnson’s tweet). Results are also confirmed by a robustness check which replicates 
the methodology on a smaller and less biased subsample, that controls the effects of all sources 
of information other than Twitter.  
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Finally, I would like to conclude the paper with some suggestions for future research. The 
proposed dissertation can be enhanced by analyzing a single or group of stocks instead of the 
entire FTSE100. It might be interesting to determine the effects of the tweets by sector and see 
if the results are homogeneous. By a-priori reasoning, we might hypothesize that some 
securities might have been more damaged by this situation of ambiguity, which has led agents 
to avoid the sectors most exposed to Brexit. 
Furthermore, similar analyses might be extended to other countries or the UK itself using a 
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Brexit, negotiation, no-deal, election, Article 50, Great Repeal Bill, Withdrawal Bill, EU, 
 
European Union, Euro 
Table 1: List of words to classify Brexit’s tweets. 
 
Type of Test 20 days 60 days 120 days 
 
White Test 0.024 0.161 0.139 
ADF Test 0.036 0.045 0.046 
Breusch-Godfrey Test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Table 2: p-values of econometric tests on abnormal returns with different estimation windows 
(20, 60, 120 days).  
White test: 𝐻0: homoscedasticity vs. 𝐻1: no homoscedasticity (heteroscedasticity). ADF Test 
with constant: 𝐻0: unit root vs. 𝐻1: stationarity. Breusch-Godfrey test: 𝐻0: no 5th order 
autocorrelation vs. 𝐻1: 5th order autocorrelation. 
 
Date Event Description 
 
24/07/2019 Boris Johnson formally takes over as Prime Minister. 
25/07/2019 Johnson commits to the October date for Brexit and refuses to rule out the 
possibility of a 'no-deal' Brexit. 
01/08/2019 Bank of England announcement on base rate. 
19/09/2019 Bank of England announcement on base rate. 
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03/10/2019 The PM delivers a statement to the Commons, outlining the Government's 
proposals for a new Brexit deal. 
14/10/2019 In front of the Parliament, hew Majesty says that her government's priority 
is to have Brexit done on 31 October. 
17/10/2019 The Prime Minister holds a press conference at the European Council, 
following the announcement of a new Brexit deal. 
19/10/2019 The PM presents his new Brexit deal, but he is defeated. He later writes to 
Donald Tusk to ask for a Brexit extension. 
21/10/2019 The European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill is introduced to 
Parliament. 
22/10/2019 The EU Bill passes its second reading, but the programme motion setting 
out the timetable is defeated. The PM pauses the legislation. 
28/10/2019 EU27 confirmed the Brexit extension to 31 January 2020. 
30/10/2019 Ministers approve the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (Exit Day) 
(Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2019, officially changing the date of 
“exit day” to 31 January 2020. The government introduces the "Early 
Parliamentary General Election Bill" which sets the date for a General 
Election to take place on 12 December. 
07/11/2019 Bank of England announcement on base rate. 
12/12/2019 General Elections result in Conservative Party majority. Johnson pledges to 
get Brexit done by 31/01/2020. 
19/12/2019 Bank of England announcement on base rate. 
The Government publishes the EU Bill. 
23/01/2019 The EU Bill receives Royal Assent and becomes an Act of Parliament. 
30/01/2020 Bank of England announcement on base rate. 
31/01/2020 The UK officially left the EU. 






Cumulative average abnormal returns 
 
T 20 days 60 days 120 days 
Average 2.64% 0.69% 0.50% 
t-statistic 9.78 2.88 2.12 
p-value 0.000 0.002 0.017 
Table 4a: Hypothesis tests on cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) by estimation 
window (T). 
 
 Abnormal returns  
T t 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Average 0.19% 0.21% 0.24% 0.21% 0.22% 0.24% 0.26% 0.29% 0.29% 0.21% 0.28% 
20 days t-stat 2.32 2.26 2.76 2.56 2.67 2.92 3.75 4.16 3.80 2.82 4.03 
 p-value 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 Average 0.02% 0.04% 0.06% 0.03% 0.04% 0.06% 0.08% 0.11% 0.12% 0.03% 0.10% 
60 days t-stat 0.2 0.39 0.71 0.36 0.50 0.74 1.20 1.62 1.52 0.45 1.53 
 p-value 0.42 0.35 0.24 0.36 0.31 0.23 0.12 0.05 0.06 0.33 0.06 
 Average 0.00% 0.02% 0.04% 0.01% 0.02% 0.04% 0.07% 0.09% 0.10% 0.02% 0.09% 
120 days t-stat -0.01 0.21 0.51 0.14 0.29 0.52 0.95 1.37 1.29 0.21 1.28 
 p-value 0.50 0.42 0.31 0.44 0.39 0.30 0.17 0.09 0.10 0.42 0.10 







OLS Regression Model 
Dependent variable: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗 
 





-0.0135 ***  
(-2.73) 




0.0301 ***  
(2.96) 










-0.0246 **  
(-2.16) 
    
    
N 135 135 135 
𝑟2 0.3409 0.2372 0.2308 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟2 0.3259 0.2197 0.2132 
F(3,131) 7.61 3.84 3.64 
Table 5: OLS regression model.  
 
Cumulative average abnormal returns 
 
 20 days 60 days 120 days 
Average 1.77% 1.43% 1.22% 
t-statistic 2.96 4.74 4.23 
p-value 0.002 0.000 0.000 




OLS Regression Model 
Dependent variable: 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗 
 
 20 days 60 days 120 days 
























    
    
N 135 135 135 
𝑟2 0.2356 0.2362 0.2478 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟2 0.2181 0.2188 0.2306 
F(3,131) 8.63 6.78 4.6 
Table 6b: Robustness check on the OLS regression model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
